Customer portal
Category

Ransomware

"SOS
Investigation, Ransomware

Ransomware – State of Play February 2024

SOS Intelligence is currently tracking 180 distinct ransomware groups, with data collection covering 348 relays and mirrors.

In the reporting period, SOS Intelligence has identified 395 instances of publicised ransomware attacks.  These have been identified through the publication of victim details and data on ransomware blog sites accessible via Tor.  Our analysis is presented below:

LockBit has maintained its position as the most active and popular ransomware strain.

This is despite significant law enforcement interruption, the impact of which will be discussed further below.

Despite law enforcement action towards the end of 2023, ALPHV/Blackcat has maintained a strong presence online and continues to post victim data.  However, owing to how the ransomware process operates, this could be seen to be victims compromised before law enforcement takedown of ALPHV/Blackcat infrastructure.

Increased activity has been identified amongst BianLian, Play, QiLin, BlackBasta, 8base and Hunters ransomware strain.  This increase may be attributed to these strains absorbing affiliates from LockBit and ALPHV/Blackcat as those services went offline.

This month, Ransomhub, AlphaLocker, Mogilevich, & Blackout have emerged as new strains.  Mogilevich has been observed targeting high-value victims, including Epic Games, luxury car company Infiniti, and the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs.

Group targeting continues to follow familiar patterns in terms of the victim’s country of origin.

Attacks have increased in South American countries, particularly in Argentina, which may be a response to presidential elections in November 2023 in which the far-right libertarian Javier Milei was elected.

Targeting continues to follow international, geopolitical lines.  Heavy targeting follows countries that have supported Ukraine against Russia.  Attacks against Sweden continued as it pressed ahead with preparations to join NATO.   This highlights the level of support ransomware groups continue to show towards the Russian state, and they will continue to use cyber crime to destabilise and weaken Western and pro-Ukrainian states.

Manufacturing and Construction and Engineering have remained the key targeted industries for February.  These industries would be more reliant on technology to continue their business activities, and so it logically follows that they would be more likely to pay a ransom to regain access to compromised computer systems.  The Financial, Retail & Wholesale, Legal, and Education sectors have also seen increased activity over the period.  Health & Social Care has seen a significant increase over the period.  This is likely in response to several groups, including ALPHV/Blackcat reacting to law enforcement activity and allowing their affiliates to begin targeting these industries.

We are seeing a shift in tactics for certain industries, particularly those where data privacy carries a higher importance (such as legal or healthcare), where threat actors are not deploying encryption software and instead relying solely on data exfiltration as the main source of material for blackmail and extortion.

LockBit Takedown

On 20 February, an international law enforcement effort was successful in taking control of and shutting down the infrastructure of the LockBit ransomware strain.  Much has been disclosed and said regarding the takedown, some of it speculative, however, it was confirmed by the UK’s National Crime Agency (NCA) and the US’s Federal Bureau of Investigation that control of their dark web domains and infrastructure was obtained, providing them with significant information regarding the activity of the LockBit group and its affiliates.

Since then, multiple LockBit blog sites have re-emerged, and new data continues to be published.  However, it is not clear whether or not this is new activity since the takedown.  It is more likely that these are victims compromised before law enforcement activity which are only now being blackmailed with data release.

We are continuing to monitor the ransomware landscape at this time to properly analyse the impact this takedown will have.  This event has had a significant impact on the reputation of the LockBit group, with many affiliates angry at the perceived lack of operational security resulting in the possible identification of their real-world identities.  We are anticipating many of these will look to gain access to the affiliate programs of other strains, and so we will expect to see a significant increase in reported attacks from those strains in the coming weeks and months.  As for LockBit, the threat actors behind the group remain active, and it is likely we will see a re-emergence as a new group in due course.

ALPHV/Blackcat exit scam

The ALPHV/Blackcat group is making headlines for all the wrong reasons.  After first having their leak site taken over by law enforcement, they now appear to have absconded with affiliate funds.

In February 2024, ALPHV/Blackcat announced an attack against healthcare provider Change Healthcare (part of United Health Group).  Following this, a ransom of $22 million was paid to ALPHV.  Several days later, the responsible affiliate took to the cybercrime forum RAMP to state that they hadn’t been paid their share of the spoils (potentially up to 90%).  It appears now that the group has collapsed from within, ending with a final exit scam as they shut down operations.  The group have further claimed to have sold their source code in the process, so we may see copycat groups emerge in due course.

While the dissolution of a notorious group should be celebrated, especially following successful law enforcement activity, it should be noted that shutting down in this way presents a significant risk to recent victims.  The affiliate responsible for the Change Healthcare data, as well as affiliates who may have been similarly affected, are likely to still hold victim data and so, for those victims, there remains a risk that they may be further blackmailed as affiliates attempt to recoup their lost earnings.

Photo by FLY:D on Unsplash

"SOS
Investigation, Ransomware

Ransomware – State of Play January 2024

SOS Intelligence currently tracks 173 distinct ransomware groups, with data collection covering 324 relays and mirrors.

In the reporting period, SOS Intelligence has identified 274 instances of publicised ransomware attacks.  These were identified through the publication of victim details and data on ransomware blog sites accessible via Tor.  Our analysis is presented below:

Threat Actor Activity

Lockbit has remained the market leader, maintaining a market share of approximately 23%.  Blackbasta, Akira, Trigona, 8base and Bianlian have seen significant increases in activity over the month, while there have been decreases in activity from Cactus, Werewolves, Siegedsec, Dragonforce, and Play.

January is typically a quieter month for ransomware threat actors.  In 2022, the volume of attacks was 17% less than the yearly average. In 2023, this increased to 54%.  This slowing of activity is likely due to the proximity of several national and religious holidays observed globally between December and January.  However, in 2024, we observed a significant increase in attacks across January.  Two factors stand out as possible causes for this:

  1. Ongoing global hostilities

It has been observed that pro-Russian cybercriminal groups have been vocally supportive of the ongoing war in Ukraine, and have diverted significant resources in targeting the supporters of Ukraine.  Similar patterns have been noted in the targeting of victims in countries which have shown support for Israel.

Although ransomware groups and threat actors are primarily financially motivated, their resources and skills are often seen turned against perceived enemies of the state, blurring the lines between criminal and hostile state activity.

  1. Counter Ransomware Initiative

The Counter Ransomware Initiative (CRI) is a US-led group of 50 nations and organisations dedicated to promoting solidarity and support in the face of ransomware activity.  In October 2023, CRI members pledged not to pay ransoms when faced with cyber attacks.

As a result, it is expected that the number of observed postings to ransomware blogs will increase as victims no longer pay ransoms.  This may show an increase in victims’ data being published, rather than an overall increase in the number of victims.

Country Targeting

As stated above, ransomware threat actors’ choice of targets can be politically motivated, as well as financially.  This is why we continue to see the majority of attacks target the USA, UK, Canada, France, Germany and Italy.  As members of the G7, these countries have strong economies and therefore possess lucrative targets for financially-minded threat actors.  However, this surge in activity may be politically motivated.  Continued support for Israel and Ukraine may give certain threat actors additional motivation to target those countries.

This month has seen an increase in attacks against victims in Sweden.  Sweden is in the process of joining NATO, which appears to have presented the country as a target for pro-Russian threat actors in support of the Russian state.  Sweden’s membership would increase NATO’s presence in and around the Baltic Sea, a key waterway for allowing the Russian Navy into the North Sea and onward into the Atlantic.  Furthermore, it would increase a NATO presence close to Russia’s border with the rest of Europe.

Industry Targeting

Manufacturing, Construction & Engineering, and Logistics & Transportation have remained the key targeted industries for January.  These industries would be more reliant on technology to continue their business activities, so it logically follows that they would be more likely to pay a ransom to regain access to compromised computer systems.  The Financial and Education sectors have also seen increased activity over the period.

We are seeing a shift in tactics for certain industries, particularly those where data privacy carries a higher importance (such as legal or healthcare), where threat actors are not deploying encryption software and instead relying solely on data exfiltration as the main source of material for blackmail and extortion.

ALPHV/Blackcat

In December 2023, law enforcement agencies from multiple jurisdictions targeted the ALPHV/Blackcat ransomware group, disrupting the groups’ activities and seizing their domain.  Shortly after, the domain was “un-seized” before law enforcement agencies took back control.  As a result of this action, the operators behind ALPHV/Blackcat have publicly withdrawn their rules regarding the targeting of Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), in apparent revenge for law enforcement activity.

Since the takedown, ALPHV/Blackcat activity has slowed but does not appear to have stopped.  In recent weeks they claim to have targeted and stolen confidential and sensitive data from Trans-Northern Pipelines in Canada, as well as Technica, a contractor working with the US Department of Defence, FBI, and USAF. 

The veracity of these claims is still being investigated, and so should be taken with a grain of salt.  The ALPHV/Blackcat group has been hurt by law enforcement, impacting their operations and losing them customers.  Therefore, it is possible that exaggerated claims are being made to save face and their reputation amongst the cybercrime community.

Photo by FLY:D on Unsplash

""/
Investigation, Opinion, Ransomware

Cybersecurity in 2024 – A Forward Look

2023 was a record year for cybercrime and threat actor activity, and we anticipate 2024 to be a continuation of this upward trend. Below we discuss a few key items we consider will be at the forefront of 2024’s cybersecurity landscape.

Expansion of ransomware operations

2023 was a record year for ransomware operators.  Reported attacks were nearly double the numbers seen in 2022. The most successful groups operated as-a-service (RaaS), allowing them time to improve and develop their product whilst others worked to deploy the malware and bring in the money. 

Law enforcement has been extremely active against these groups, taking down infrastructure relating to HIVE and ALPHV variants. However, in the latter’s case, this has seemingly slowed, but not halted their operations and they remain active in some capacity into 2024. Current data has shown a slight decline in the number of posts to their leak site however, this is a common pattern seen across many different variants and is likely due to the links to Russia and periods of inactivity over the holiday period.

We expect this year to be no exception to the continued growth of ransomware operations.  It remains a lucrative opportunity for threat actors and the RaaS operating model allows less-skilled operators to partake in this criminal activity.

It is anticipated that ransomware tactics will expand to provide further opportunities to “motivate” victims into paying a ransom for their data.  This will include the threat of deployment of “Wiper” malware – designed to fully delete an infected device or network in the event of non-compliance.

An increase in Supply Chain Attacks

It is highly anticipated that supply chain compromise will continue to be a tactic of choice for financially motivated and nation-state threat actors, who routinely and opportunistically scan the internet to identify unpatched systems ripe for exploitation.  

The efficiency of supply chain attacks will likely be improved by both the infection and dissemination of software packages granting third-party access.  This in turn allows threat actors to select and target their victims on a larger scale, leading to increased levels of compromise and wider attack surfaces for the deployment of malicious code.  Subsequently, this will allow threat actors to better maintain persistence within victim networks, granting more time to conduct reconnaissance, analyse connected networks, and spread to encompass more victims.

It is anticipated that supply chain attacks will target vulnerabilities in generative AI ecosystems. With AI and LLMs being utilised more and more to improve productivity, inevitably supply chains are becoming more interconnected.  Failure to properly secure these components within the supply chain could be fatal, allowing threat actors to poison AI training data, manipulate updates, inject malicious algorithms, engage in prompt engineering, or exploit vulnerabilities as an entry point to compromise organisations’ data or systems.

The growth of AI-driven cyber-crime

AI has seen a massive boom in 2023, and this is expected to continue into 2024 and beyond as it becomes increasingly integrated into all manner of processes and procedures.

In 2024, we anticipate a surge in threat actors embracing AI to improve the quality and speed of development of the tools in their arsenal. This will include a quick and cost-effective way to develop new malware and ransomware variants.  We also expect to see the increasing use of deepfake technologies to improve the standard of phishing and impersonation to support cyber-enabled frauds and business email compromise (BEC)

In contrast, it is anticipated that cyber security will employ a proactive strategy; as threat actors continue to harness the potential of AI and machine learning, cyber defenders will look to utilise similar techniques to counter these offensive tactics. The cyber security industry is already making substantial investments into the use of AI for defensive purposes, and this is expected to grow and be adopted by more in the field.  Generative AI (GenAI)-powered capabilities such as automated code generation, reverse engineering, and document exploitation will reach previously unthinkable levels of sophistication and speed. 

It is believed that GenAI will provide an improved toolkit to those targeting the human element when seeking to compromise network security.  GenAI will provide threat actors with an easier method for developing more convincing phishing messages at scale, create video and audio deepfakes, and more easily collect information on their targets. This highlights the need in 2024 for an increased focus on awareness training to better prepare staff and colleagues for the inevitable surge of phishing attacks in 2024.

Key Global Events

Geopolitics is a key motivator for threat actors in certain sectors, particularly nation-states and hacktivists.  Many key global events are scheduled for this year, providing high-profile targets for those who would seek to manipulate these events for their own gains.

Elections are due to be held in the following countries:

  • Taiwan
  • USA
  • Iran
  • Russia
  • Ukraine
  • South Korea
  • India
  • Austria
  • United Kingdom
  • European Parliament

The BRICS group is due to expand, taking on the following new members: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.  BRICS is now seen as an economic group to rival the G7, so it is anticipated that this expansion will lead to increased targeting of G7 financial institutions.

In July, the 2024 Summer Olympic Games will be held in Paris, France.  Such events provide numerous opportunities for threat actors to make financial gains through fraudulent ticketing, and phishing to obtain financial data and credentials.  Furthermore, it provides a canvas with global attention for those with a hacktivist agenda, ensuring their message reaches a wide audience.

Regulatory Changes Driving Threat Actor Innovation

Changes to regulations regarding the reporting of significant breaches, implemented in the USA by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), will force threat actors to hone and improve their stealth methods.  We anticipate seeing increased focus on encryption and evasion techniques to allow threat actors to maintain undetected persistence within victim networks, to avoid triggering reporting to the SEC, and the expected forensic-level scrutiny that would follow.  We believe that threat actors may look to non-material systems as a lower-risk target and entry point, quietly building their access, persistence and privileges from there before targeting higher-value network resources.

Additionally, we are also beginning to see ransomware groups using this new reporting requirement as an additional blackmail tool, threatening to report victims to the SEC themselves if their demands are not met.  It is expected that this tactic will expand in use over the year to come.

What’s in store for SOS Intelligence in 2024

2024 looks to be an exciting year for SOS Intelligence.

Our team is growing further with a full time developer joining in early 2024.  This will allow us to focus on improving the usability of the product, implement new features, and generate new data collection streams.

One of our key focus areas will be to improve the quality of the context around the data we provide.  Improvements made to the platform will allow customers to see pertinent information relating to data sources, giving context to the risk and threat posed by that source.  This will allow customers to make more informed decisions about the risks to their business or that of their clients.

We will also be looking to expand and improve the quality of our data collection.  One particular focus will be on improving the reporting of CVEs.  We aim to expedite alerts of new, high-risk vulnerabilities to our clients and subscribers so they can better mitigate and protect against the risks they pose.

SOS Intelligence has been diligently monitoring the digital landscape over 2023.  Our recent findings are a stark reminder of the rising threat of phishing attacks.  Over the past year, we have observed over half a million unique credentials compromised through phishing, and with the growth of GenAI techniques, we expect that number to grow in 2024.

One standout feature of our technology is our real-time alert system.  This capability ensures that our clients are promptly notified when their staff have fallen victim to phishing, allowing for a swift response and effective risk mitigation.

The unique services we provide at SOS Intelligence aren’t just about securing your digital assets; it’s a practical investment in proactive cybersecurity.  Join us in creating a more secure digital environment.

Header Photo by freestocks on Unsplash

"SOS
Investigation, Ransomware

Ransomware – State of Play December 2023

SOS Intelligence is currently tracking 170 distinct ransomware groups, with data collection covering 319 relays and mirrors.

In the reporting period, SOS Intelligence has identified 373 instances of publicised ransomware attacks.  These have been identified through the publication of victim details and data on ransomware blog sites accessible via Tor.  Our analysis is presented below:

We first look at strain activity.  As ever, the ransomware landscape is dominated by strains using affiliate models (Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS)).  Lockbit remains the most active strain, and while there has been a decrease in overall activity, it maintains a 22% market share.  8base, AlphV and Play remain significantly active, but this month we have also seen significant activity by Hunters (RaaS), Cactus (RaaS), and Dragonforce.

Dragonforce are a newly emerged group, with little known about them at the time of print.  Given the level of successful disruption by law enforcement during 2023, it is suspected that this group may be a rebranding of a previous threat group.

The Werewolves group has been observed increasing their level of attacks.  The group appears relatively new, however, they have taken responsibility for a 2022 attack on the Electric Company of Ghana which resulted in significant power outages.  The veracity of this claim is not known.  Their level of activity is called into question by several of their victims also appearing on the LockBit breach site.  Six identical posts were seen across both sites.  Additionally, the ransomware used is a public domain version of Lockbit3, while their attacks make use of tools leaked from the Conti group.  This would seem to indicate that the group was previously an affiliate of LockBit.

What makes this group standout is the targeting of Russian victims.  Ransomware groups and operators are quite often pro-russian, with several groups supporting the Russian government publicly in its war against Ukraine.  The targeting may explain a potential split from LockBit, and hint at a possible location for the group.

Finally, we have observed increased activity from the SiegedSec group.  They appear focused more on data exfiltration, and are politically, rather than financially, motivated. Their focus has been on hacktivism, with a significant focus on targeting Israel and the USA.

As seen in previous months, the USA remains the primary target of ransomware groups and threat actors.  We have observed a steady release of data from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and the UK.  As members of the G7, these countries have strong economies and therefore possess lucrative targets for financially-minded threat actors. 

However, this surge in activity may be politically motivated.  In recent weeks these countries have all shown support for Israel in its conflict with Hamas, which may give certain threat actors additional motivation to target those countries.  As highlighted previously, there have also been significant increases in the targeting of Israel and Russia.

Manufacturing, Construction and Engineering, and IT and Technology have remained the key targeted industries for December.  These industries would be more reliant on technology in order to continue their business activities, and so it logically follows that they would be more likely to pay a ransom in order to regain access to compromised computer systems.  The Financial and Education sectors have also seen increased activity over the period.

We are seeing a shift in tactics for certain industries, particularly those where data privacy carries a higher importance (such as legal or healthcare), where threat actors are not deploying encryption software and instead relying solely on data exfiltration as the main source of material for blackmail and extortion.

Photo by FLY:D on Unsplash

"SOS
Investigation, Ransomware

Ransomware – State of Play November 2023

SOS Intelligence is currently tracking 166 distinct ransomware groups. Data collection covers 309 relays and mirrors, 110 of which are currently online.

In the reporting period, SOS Intelligence has identified 437 instances of publicised ransomware attacks.  These have been identified through the publication of victim details and data on ransomware blog sites accessible via Tor. Our analysis is presented below:

As in previous months, the ransomware landscape is dominated by strains using affiliate models. Lockbit remains the most active strain, and has seen a 73% increase in breach posts when compared to the previous month. High on the list is 8base, who release a large amount of data on 30th November. In contrast to the other high-profile groups observed, it is believed that the 8base group do not have their own proprietary ransomware, but instead rely on using other ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) variants, such as Phobos.

As seen in previous months, the USA remains the primary target of ransomware groups and threat actors.  We have observed an increased release of data from France, Germany and Italy, while the UK and Canada have remained high on the list of targeted countries. 

As members of the G7, these countries have strong economies and therefore possess lucrative targets for financially-minded threat actors. However, this surge in activity may be politically motivated.  In recent weeks these countries have all shown support for Israel in its conflict with Hamas, which may give certain threat actors additional motivation to target those countries.

Logistics, manufacturing, and construction have remained the key targeted industries for November.  These industries would be more reliant on technology in order to continue their business activities, and so it logically follows that they would be more likely to pay a ransom in order to regain access to compromised computer systems.  We are seeing a shift in tactics for certain industries, particularly those where data privacy carries a higher importance (such as legal or healthcare), where threat actors are not deploying encryption software and instead relying solely on data exfiltration as the main source of material for blackmail and extortion.

New for this month we have also considered the victim ownership; whether they’re privately or publicly owned.  Within breach sites, the publicised victims are overwhelmingly privately owned.  Publicly-owned victims tend to be either smaller, local government entities or educational districts within the US school system.  Higher level public entities, while offering a lucrative target for hostile state actors, but may be more than a financially-motivated threat actor wishes to take on, owing to the likely increased law enforcement effort to obtain a judicial outcome.

Photo by FLY:D on Unsplash

"SOS
Investigation, Ransomware

Ransomware Statistics for October 2023

SOS Intelligence is currently tracking 163 distinct ransomware groups. Data collection covers 299 relays and mirrors, 93 of which are currently online.

In the reporting period, SOS Intelligence has identified 337 instances of publicised ransomware attacks.  These have been identified through the publication of victim details and data on ransomware blog sites accessible via Tor. Our analysis is presented below:

Our first graph shows attacks organised by strain. The most prominent threat groups have been AlphV/BlackCat, Play, and LockBit3. All three provide operate a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) business model, which would increase the number of threat actors using them, so it is no surprise to see these variants appearing responsible for more attacks.

Secondly, we have looked at the spread of victims by country of origin.  The USA remains the target of choice for many ransomware groups and threat actors, owing to the value of its economy and the likelihood of victims to pay ransoms.

A significant number of victims have been identified in Bulgaria, all of whom were targeted by the RansomedVC strain.  RansomedVC does operate a RaaS business model, so it is hypothesised that this has been a single threat actor specifically targeting Bulgarian retail businesses. 

Finally, we have looked at the targeted industries. Business Services, Manufacturing and Retail sectors have experienced significantly more targeting. This is likely due to their reliance on technology to undertake their business functions: a company more reliant on technology is more likely to pay if their services and networks are disrupted.

Photo by FLY:D on Unsplash

"CLOP
Ransomware

Clop issue ultimatum and SOS Intelligence quoted on the BBC news site

Joe Tidy, the BBC’s Cyber correspondent has written an interesting piece on the MOVEit hack which we issued a Flash Alert about last week.

A prolific cyber crime gang thought to be based in Russia has issued an ultimatum to victims of a hack that has hit organisations around the world. 

The Clop group posted a notice on the dark web warning firms affected by the MOVEit hack to email them before 14 June or stolen data will be published.

More than 100,000 staff at the BBC, British Airways and Boots have been told payroll data may have been taken.

BBC

The post by the Clop group urges victim organisations to send an email to the gang to begin a negotiation on the crew’s darknet portal. Our CEO and Founder, Amir was also quoted after speaking with Joe:

“My take is that they just have so much data that it is difficult for them to get on top of it all. They’re betting that if you know then you will contact them,” says SOS Intelligence CEO Amir Hadžipasić.”

Amir Hadžipasić

The critical, zero-day vulnerability in MOVEit Transfer is being actively targeted by threat actors to facilitate data theft.

MOVEit Transfer is a managed file transfer (MFT) solution developed by Ipswitch.  It allows the users to securely transfer files between consumers and partners using SFTP, SCP, and HTTP-based uploads.

The exploit, as yet unassigned a CVE, is being utilised by the Clop group to facilitate mass downloads of victim company data, now known to be the likes of the BBC, BA and Boots.

What is key, is this is likely to be a third party vulnerability which has led to some of these major organisations to be compromised. Many of the organisations are not direct users of the MOVEit software, but outsourced their payroll services to a third-party called Zellis, which was a victim.

Third party cyberthreats are increasingly important due to the porous nature of relationships between companies and organisations.

We are running a webinar on June 14th at 11am UK time discussing how SOS Intelligence can help with this threat. You can sign up here.

"IHG
Ransomware

Hackers can be rather malicious – TeaPea hackers blitz hotel data

Why do hackers do what they do? Some do it for kicks, some form out of the challenge and of course, many do it for money.

However, some do it for revenge and out of pure vindictiveness.

This was the reason given by a couple from Vietnam who firstly attempted a ransomware attack and when that didn’t work, hit the delete key!

The victim? IHG, a global chain of hotels. They own a wealth of brands including the luxury Six Senses and also more mainstream properties such as Holiday Inn.

Joe Tidy has the lowdown on what happened over on the BBC website and is well worth a read.

What really tops off this story is the password… Firstly, all 200,000 employees had access to the password vault. Secondly and wait for it… The password was Qwerty1234. Yes, really.

The moral of this sad tale is that you should use a “proper” password, not let everyone have access to your passwords and last but not least, be very cautious with emails with links and attachments. The hackers said that they gained access to the internal IT network by tricking an employee into downloading a malicious piece of software through a booby-trapped email attachment. Oops.

Now I’m sure you are reading this and thinking, that could never happen to me, but you would be surprised. Many, many people have inadvertently clicked / opened something they should have left well alone, but when tired, in a rush or distracted, it’s easy to do.

Stay alert out there.

"SOS
Investigation, Ransomware

A Special Investigation exposing a ransomware group’s clear-web IP and their duplicate identities

Intro

Before we dive into this investigation it’s worth to just spend a brief moment to describe the Apache Server-Status page.

The Apache Server Status page is a diagnostics and metrics page provided by the mod_status module. When mod_status is enabled a metrics page is served via localhost on the /server-status path. 

This page is typically served via localhost only. It offers diagnostic information about the Apache service and client requests. It shows the full request URI and client IP information.

Serving this page in production, outside of localhost would be considered an information disclosure vulnerability and could offer an attacker information about client requests, essentially anything disclosed in a POST request URI or GET request. 

In the scope of Tor onion services where a Tor service is published it will inherently expose all localhost services to the entirety of Tor – therefore any services designed to be protected by the typically non externally routeable local loopback interface become externally accessible.

Locating Onions with Server-Status Pages

We must first export a list of all onions we are aware of that have server-status pages. One of the tasks we perform when crawling an onion service is to identify interesting paths and services. We perform a check for common directories such as server-status along with many others.

This process is identical to a directory enumeration, except for being far more optimised to ensure crawler performance is prioritised.

Therefore using our path API we are able to query for all onions we’ve found and that are operational with server status pages:

server path search for server-status pages API

We find that there are 1,370 results with server-status pages:

Search results JSON export

The next task is to compile a list of all known (relatively current) ransomware blogs. We do this by merging our own lists, those we’ve found via OSINT and other published ransomware group site lists.

Of those we find a total of 71 onion unique addresses, these include v2 and v3 onions.

Now we have a relatively straightforward task of cross-checking our server-status results against this list to see what ransomware group sites have server-status pages, if any.

We do this with a very simple bash script that uses the grep tool:

Checking out output we see that there are in total only 3 ransomware blogs/group sites:

Arvin Club, Haron & Midas

Checking the first, Arvin Club:

We see that the server status page presents a vhost of localhost, not much to go by!

We also note that the server is running Ubuntu and is located in the UTC time zone.

Haron Server-Status Page

Checking the Haron server-status page we see that again the vhost is localhost, the server is running Debian and the time zone is Moscow Standard Time (MSK)

Lastly, checking the Midas server status page:

Midas Server-Status Page

We see a VHOST that is not localhost, this time it shows as “Becquerel.selectel.ru”

A server running Debian and a time zone of Moscow standard time.

Becquerel.selectel.ru

The hostname exposed in the servers-status page for the Midas shows that the web server running the Midas blog is being hosted by Selectel a Russian cloud hosting company:


For at least a short period of time the clear web portion of the Midas blog was exposed to the internet allowing Google to crawl and index the server-status page. 

The Google Cache is of a AWS IP, Germany “3.70.39.23” . According to the Google Cache entry the server was exposed at least up to 27th of September 2021 likely some time before that date, possibly after the 2nd of October 2021. 

How are we sure that this cache entry is the Midas blog web-server? 

It could very likely have been another server if Selectel reprovision hostnames. The evidence contained in the server-status client requests for the Becquerel host cache page are unique to the files found on the current Midas blog. 

Identical files requested in the Google Cache as what exists on the Midas blog web server

We can say with strong certainty that the cache entry, the clear-web IP and hostname all belong to the Midas web server and that the host is current and operational. 

Linking Midas to Haron and Avaddon

Reviewing the client request on refresh revealed some interesting paths. These paths point to image and file locations. Further investigation of these paths uncovered content that is shared or identical to both the Haron and Midas blogs. 

For example…

Haron test.jpg image

Midas test.jpg image

Artist: https://twitter.com/JarekMadyda

Midas Victim file [redacted]

Identical victim file on the Haron web server

Midas Mess directory

Mess directory

Identical but older Mess directory on the Haron web server

Haron mess directory

There is significant cross referencing between folder structures and files to show that the Midas web blog is a copy of the Haron web blog, if we go by the last modified date stamps on all of the files we have been able to observe across both blog sites. 

Not only do the sharing of files and file structure suggest that this is the same group/operator but both web sites have each other’s logos.

Further, we can see logo “development” taking place with logo names such as “newlogo2.png” and “finalLogo.png”. We propose it would be very unusual for one seemingly competing group to have another group’s logo on their web server and indeed for them to have each others!

The curious case of Avaddon

On the topic of logos. Investigation showed that both Haron and Midas contained the logo file for Avaddon Ransomware group:

There were rumours that not only Haron / Midas were the same group but that there were links with Haron to Avaddon.

Forum post on the Dublikat (Duplicate) dark web forum:

“Haron is built on code copied from other ransomware. So, the researchers noticed the following “parallels”: to create binaries, Haron uses the old ransomware builder Thanos; The ransomware site, where victims are asked to negotiate and pay the ransom, is almost identical to Avaddon’s site (as is the site for leaking stolen data); the ransom letter contains large snippets of text copied from a similar Avaddon note; Haron’s server contains icons and images previously found on the official Avaddon website. What all these similarities are connected with is still unclear. The researchers believe that the Haron operators may have hired one of the former Avaddon members, but they clearly did not have access to the source code of the Avaddon ransomware.”

Translated.

We are now able to shed a bit more light on this forum post. It would seem that not only did Haron share resources, images text and icons but so does Midas now too, since it is just a copy of the Haron blog.

Although Avaddon is now defunct and their onion address is no longer valid we’ve been able to extract a html cache of their page from our index. 

Making minor changes to the HTML code, to refacing the Midas and Haron onion address we’ve effectively been able to “resurrect” the old Avaddon website.

Minor html updates to the Avaddon historic html source:

These minor updates allowed us to load the html source and have the page render in an almost exact way it would have done in the past.

Avaddon website resurrected loaded locally from a file:

And this is because the file and folder structure of the Haron / Midas websites still contain the original logo CSS and other content that were made for the Avaddon ransomware group website.

We are therefore able to put forward the claim supported by the evidence in this article that all previous suggestions that these groups were interlinked do appear to be correct.

We’ve confirmed the following Clear Web IPs for both Haron and Midas, both hosted by Selectel Russia:

45.146.164.58 – Midas

45.93.201.176 – Haron

This proves our assumption that the blogs are hosted on separate VMs both hosted at Selectel.

1 2
Privacy Settings
We use cookies to enhance your experience while using our website. If you are using our Services via a browser you can restrict, block or remove cookies through your web browser settings. We also use content and scripts from third parties that may use tracking technologies. You can selectively provide your consent below to allow such third party embeds. For complete information about the cookies we use, data we collect and how we process them, please check our Privacy Policy
Youtube
Consent to display content from - Youtube
Vimeo
Consent to display content from - Vimeo
Google Maps
Consent to display content from - Google
Spotify
Consent to display content from - Spotify
Sound Cloud
Consent to display content from - Sound