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Investigation, The Dark Web

Analysing DDoSIA: Threat Intelligence Insights into a Coordinated DDoS Operation

In the evolving landscape of cyber threats, DDoSIA has emerged as a significant force, orchestrating distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against organisations worldwide. Believed to be operated by pro-Russian hacktivist groups, DDoSIA mobilises volunteer participants to overwhelm targeted networks, causing disruptions to businesses, government institutions, and critical infrastructure. With its decentralised approach and sustained campaigns, this operation has become a persistent threat to cybersecurity resilience.

Tracking DDoSIA is crucial for cybersecurity and threat intelligence (CTI) professionals. By understanding its tactics, techniques, and infrastructure, defenders can better anticipate attacks, mitigate their impact, and adapt defensive strategies. As part of our mission at SOS Intelligence, we continuously monitor, collect, and analyse DDoSIA-related data, offering actionable intelligence to help organisations stay ahead of this evolving threat.

Understanding DDoSIA and Its Attack Infrastructure

DDoSIA is a coordinated distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) campaign operated by pro-Russian hacktivist groups, notably NoName057(16). This group, along with other affiliated threat actors, is known for conducting disruptive cyber operations against organisations and governments deemed hostile to Russian interests. NoName057(16) has been active since at least 2022, launching frequent DDoS attacks against Western institutions, particularly those supporting Ukraine. The group operates as part of a broader ecosystem of pro-Russian cyber collectives, often aligning with entities like KillNet and Anonymous Russia, which share similar geopolitical motivations.

Unlike state-sponsored advanced persistent threats (APTs) that focus on espionage or destructive cyberattacks, DDoSIA is a crowdsourced DDoS initiative, incentivising participants to join attacks. Volunteers—many of whom are ideologically aligned with Russia’s geopolitical stance—are recruited via messaging platforms and forums, where they receive instructions and access to attack tools. Participants are often encouraged through financial rewards or patriotic motivations, making DDoSIA a hybrid between hacktivism and cyber warfare.

How DDoSIA Operates

DDoSIA primarily leverages volumetric and application-layer DDoS attacks, aiming to overwhelm websites, APIs, and network infrastructure. Attack vectors include:

  • HTTP flooding – Generating large numbers of HTTP requests to exhaust server resources.
  • UDP and TCP floods – Saturating network bandwidth with high-volume traffic.
  • Slowloris attacks – Holding connections open to deplete available server connections.
  • Bot-assisted attacks – Some participants utilise proxy networks and automated scripts to scale up attack intensity.

The group has targeted various sectors, including government agencies, financial institutions, defence contractors, and logistics providers. A particular focus has been placed on countries actively supporting Ukraine, such as the UK, the US, Poland, and Germany. Attack campaigns often coincide with key political events, military aid announcements, or sanctions imposed against Russia, demonstrating a coordinated cyber-influence strategy.

The Importance of Real-Time Intelligence

Given DDoSIA’s adaptive tactics and decentralised operational model, real-time intelligence is critical for understanding and mitigating its impact. Traditional DDoS mitigation measures alone are insufficient, as the threat landscape evolves rapidly. Continuous monitoring of:

  • Attack infrastructure changes (e.g., new command-and-control nodes, shifting IP ranges).
  • Recruitment activities in underground forums and messaging platforms.
  • Indicators of compromise (IOCs) and attack patterns.

…enables cybersecurity teams to stay ahead of threats.

At SOS Intelligence, we actively track, collect, and analyse DDoSIA-related intelligence, helping organisations anticipate attacks, implement proactive defences, and mitigate operational disruptions before they escalate. By leveraging OSINT, deep web monitoring, and network telemetry, we provide actionable insights to counter the evolving tactics of DDoSIA and its affiliates.

Analysis, Evaluation, and Recommendations

Understanding DDoSIA’s Attack Trends

Unlike financially motivated DDoS campaigns, which often involve extortion or ransom demands, DDoSIA’s attacks are ideologically driven and aim to disrupt services in nations perceived as adversaries of Russia.

Since October 2024, SOS Intelligence has been collecting data from the DDoSIA network, the analysis of which provides critical insight into DDoSIA’s recent campaigns, revealing its geopolitical focus, attack methodologies, and targeted infrastructure. The findings help contextualise the scope of the operation, exposing which nations, industries, and services are most affected.

1. Top Targeted Countries

The distribution of attacks by country reveals a strategic effort to disrupt organisations aligned against Russian interests. The most targeted nations include:

  • Ukraine – Consistently the most heavily attacked country, aligning with DDoSIA’s broader mission to destabilise Ukrainian institutions and weaken its digital infrastructure. The targeting of government agencies, financial institutions, and media organisations suggests an attempt to create operational disruption and information blackout scenarios.
  • Poland & the Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) – These nations have been frequent targets of Russian-aligned cyber campaigns due to their strong support for Ukraine. Their strategic position in NATO and the EU’s Eastern flank makes them key adversaries in Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy.
  • Western European Nations (France, Germany, UK, Italy, Spain) – The presence of these countries in DDoSIA’s targeting list suggests an attempt to undermine NATO members and critical Western businesses, particularly those providing support to Ukraine.
  • Czech Republic & Slovakia – These Central European nations have seen increasing attacks, likely due to their role in military aid and logistical support to Ukraine.

Evaluation

The targeting strategy aligns with broader Russian state-aligned cyber operations, which aim to erode public trust in institutions and disrupt critical services. The focus on government, finance, and media sectors indicates an effort to undermine operational stability and create ripple effects that extend beyond the direct victims.

Implications for Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI):

  • Intelligence gathering on Russian hacktivist groups should prioritise understanding evolving target lists to anticipate future attacks.
  • Governments and high-risk organisations in these regions should implement heightened DDoS protections and real-time monitoring to mitigate potential disruptions.

2. Top Victim IPs and Their DDoS Mitigation Status

A key insight from the dataset is the list of IPs that sustained the highest number of DDoS attacks, offering a window into DDoSIA’s strategic intent. The most frequently targeted IPs include:

  • Ukrainian Government Infrastructure (91.212.223.216, 18 attacks) – This aligns with previous attacks on Ukrainian state services, attempting to disrupt government communications, digital services, and emergency response systems.
  • Microsoft (13.107.246.44 & 13.107.246.61, 14 & 12 attacks) – These IPs are tied to Azure-hosted services, suggesting DDoSIA is attempting to target cloud infrastructure supporting Western businesses or cybersecurity initiatives.
  • Polish Banking Networks (193.19.152.74, 10 attacks) – The focus on financial institutions is indicative of an effort to destabilise economic activity in Poland, a strong supporter of Ukraine.
  • French E-commerce & Hosting Services (51.91.236.193, 8 attacks) – The targeting of commercial platforms suggests that DDoSIA is testing the impact of attacks on economic stability and supply chains.

DDoS Mitigation Status Analysis

One of the most notable findings is that many of these victim IPs do not publicly advertise their use of Cloudflare, AWS Shield, or other major DDoS mitigation services. This raises concerns about their ability to withstand sustained attack campaigns.

  • High-profile organisations like Microsoft likely have in-house protections, but the presence of their IPs on the list suggests that attackers are attempting to overwhelm cloud-based services.
  • Government infrastructure in Ukraine and Poland appears to be a primary target, reinforcing the need for centralised state-sponsored DDoS defences.
  • Smaller financial institutions and e-commerce platforms may lack the necessary defences, leaving them vulnerable to outages.

Evaluation

The data suggests that DDoSIA’s attack strategy is not just about volume but also persistence. By continuously targeting specific IPs associated with critical services, they are attempting to cause prolonged service degradation rather than instant takedowns.

Recommendations:

  • At-risk organisations should conduct a full audit of their current DDoS protection measures, ensuring they use enterprise-grade filtering solutions.
  • Cloud-based services should enhance their rate-limiting policies to mitigate bot-driven HTTP floods.
  • Government agencies should coordinate with cybersecurity providers to implement real-time defence measures.

3. Top Attack Methods and Vectors

DDoSIA utilises a combination of attack techniques designed to bypass basic mitigation measures. The most frequently observed attack vectors include:

  • TCP SYN Floods – A classic technique used to exhaust connection resources on servers.
  • HTTP GET/POST Floods – Targeting application-layer services, often overwhelming login pages, checkout processes, or API endpoints.
  • DNS Amplification – Leveraging misconfigured DNS servers to exponentially increase attack traffic.

Evaluation

The presence of HTTP-layer floods indicates an intentional effort to bypass traditional DDoS filtering, which primarily focuses on volumetric mitigation. The attack patterns suggest that DDoSIA’s botnet includes a mix of compromised systems, VPNs, and residential IPs, making mitigation more complex.

Recommendations

For Organisations at Risk

  1. Implement Layered DDoS Mitigation
    • Use a high-quality DDoS mitigation package, such as Cloudflare, AWS Shield, or Akamai for automated volumetric protection.
    • Deploy Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) to filter out malicious HTTP traffic.
  2. Proactive Threat Intelligence & Monitoring
  1. Implement network anomaly detection tools to identify and block low-volume, high-impact attacks.
  2. Use geolocation filtering to block or challenge traffic from high-risk regions.
  3. Strengthen API & Login Security
  1. Enforce CAPTCHAs and rate-limiting on login and checkout pages.
  2. Deploy bot management solutions to detect automated DDoS tools.

For CTI Professionals & Security Teams

  1. Expand DDoSIA Attribution & Tracking
    • Monitor NoName057(16)’s recruitment channels to identify new botnet strategies.
    • Use honeypots and deception techniques to study attack behaviour in real-time.
  2. Enhance Threat Intelligence Sharing
  1. Collaborate with government agencies and private sector security teams to exchange attack data.
  2. Track botnet infrastructure and preemptively blacklist high-risk traffic sources.
  3. Develop & Update DDoS Playbooks
  1. Conduct regular red team exercises to test DDoS resilience.
  2. Simulate HTTP-layer and multi-vector attacks to identify weaknesses before adversaries exploit them.

Conclusion

The DDoSIA campaign, orchestrated by the NoName057(16) collective, is more than just a disruptive force—it is a tactically coordinated effort aimed at destabilising key institutions in countries opposing Russian geopolitical interests. The data analysed from recent attacks highlights clear patterns in target selection, attack vectors, and mitigation gaps, providing crucial insights into how organisations can defend against such threats.

The attack data reveals a strong geopolitical alignment, with Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic states, and Western European nations being primary targets. The focus on government agencies, financial institutions, and media organisations suggests an intent to erode public confidence, interfere with economic stability, and control narratives in critical regions. Additionally, the fact that Microsoft-hosted services and Polish banking networks have been frequently attacked underlines the strategic importance of both public and private sector entities remaining highly vigilant.

A notable trend is the increasing use of application-layer DDoS techniques (e.g., HTTP floods, DNS amplification, SYN floods), which require more than just volumetric DDoS mitigation. Attackers are leveraging residential proxies, VPN services, and compromised IoT botnets to make their traffic appear legitimate, complicating detection and response efforts.

DDoS as a Smokescreen for Other Cyber Threats

While DDoS attacks are disruptive, they can also serve as a distraction for more insidious cyber activities, such as:

  • Network Intrusions & Data Exfiltration – Attackers may launch DDoS attacks to overwhelm security teams, diverting attention while stealing sensitive data or planting backdoors in the organisation’s infrastructure.
  • Ransomware Deployment – A coordinated DDoS attack could mask the initial stages of ransomware infections, where threat actors attempt to move laterally through a network before detonating their payloads.
  • Supply Chain Compromise – Threat actors may target cloud-based services or third-party providers with DDoS attacks, creating cascading failures that expose vulnerabilities in interconnected systems.

For security teams, this means that DDoS attacks should never be treated in isolation. Organisations must simultaneously monitor network traffic, logs, and user activity for signs of unauthorised access, privilege escalation, or data exfiltration attempts occurring under the cover of a DDoS event.

Strategic Recommendations

To counteract the risks posed by DDoSIA and other hacktivist-driven campaigns, organisations must adopt a multi-layered cybersecurity strategy:

  • Advanced DDoS Protection – Deploy Cloudflare, AWS Shield, Akamai, or on-premise DDoS mitigation solutions, with an emphasis on layer 7 (application-level) attack filtering.
  • Real-Time Threat Intelligence & Incident Response – Maintain continuous monitoring of attack trends and collaborate with threat intelligence providers to detect emerging tactics early.
  • Cross-Channel Security Visibility – Integrate SIEM solutions and Network Detection & Response (NDR) tools to ensure that security teams aren’t solely focused on DDoS traffic, but also on potential concurrent threats.
  • Red Teaming & Attack Simulations – Conduct regular stress-testing of infrastructure and simulate multi-pronged attack scenarios to evaluate how well defensive controls hold up under real-world conditions.
  • Enhanced Access Controls & Zero Trust – Implement strict user authentication, segmentation of critical systems, and anomaly detection mechanisms to prevent lateral movement during attacks.

Final Thoughts

The DDoSIA campaign exemplifies the increasingly coordinated and persistent nature of cyber threats that blend hacktivism, cybercrime, and geopolitical objectives. As attack techniques evolve, organisations must move beyond reactive defences and adopt proactive, intelligence-driven security strategies.

Crucially, security teams must recognise that DDoS attacks may not be the endgame—they could be a diversion tactic for deeper, more damaging intrusions. By combining DDoS mitigation with network forensics, endpoint monitoring, and proactive intelligence-sharing, organisations can stay ahead of evolving threats and prevent large-scale disruptions before they take hold.

Ultimately, early detection, rapid response, and holistic cybersecurity visibility will determine whether organisations withstand or succumb to these politically motivated cyber assaults.

How SOS Intelligence Empowers You to Analyse and Mitigate DDoSIA Threats

For organisations looking to take a proactive approach to defending against DDoSIA, SOS Intelligence provides raw and processed data that can be leveraged for deeper analysis. Rather than simply offering static reports, our platform enables security teams to interrogate the data in real-time, uncovering trends, patterns, and attack methodologies that can directly inform defence strategies.

Using our threat intelligence feeds, organisations can:

  • Correlate Attacker Behaviour – By analysing historical and live attack data, security teams can identify recurring attack patterns, such as preferred attack vectors, geographic focus, and time-based fluctuations in activity.
  • Investigate Victimology – By reviewing which organisations, IP ranges, and services are being targeted, defenders can assess their own risk exposure and determine whether their industry, supply chain, or region is in DDoSIA’s crosshairs.
  • Detect Emerging Attack Trends – With access to raw network and attack metadata, users can identify new methods being deployed by DDoSIA before they become widespread. This allows for early countermeasure deployment before adversaries refine their techniques.
  • Enrich Internal Threat Intelligence – Security teams can cross-reference SOS Intelligence data with their own logs, SIEM alerts, and network telemetry to detect potential early-stage reconnaissance or ongoing infiltration attempts.
  • Assess DDoS Mitigation Effectiveness – By tracking which victims have successfully mitigated attacks, teams can gain insight into which defensive solutions (e.g., Cloudflare, AWS Shield, on-premise filtering) have proven most effective.

Turning Intelligence into Action

The true value of SOS Intelligence’s DDoSIA data lies in its ability to empower security professionals to extract their own insights. By combining our raw intelligence with in-house security expertise, organisations can:

  • Adjust firewall rules and DDoS protection settings based on the latest attack techniques.
  • Pre-emptively strengthen defences if they belong to an at-risk industry, country, or sector.
  • Monitor attack shifts in real-time to anticipate secondary threats such as network intrusions, data exfiltration, or ransomware campaigns that may accompany a DDoS event.
  • Share intelligence within their cybersecurity community to strengthen collective resilience against DDoSIA and similar threats.

Your Intelligence, Your Analysis, Your Defence

SOS Intelligence doesn’t just provide data, it offers a toolset for investigation and insight generation. By leveraging our feeds, logs, and analysis tools, security teams can turn raw data into actionable intelligence, enabling them to detect, understand, and mitigate DDoSIA threats before they escalate.

By combining our intelligence with your expertise, your organisation can stay ahead of DDoSIA’s evolving tactics and transform threat data into a proactive defence strategy.

Header image source – GBHackers.

"Dark
Investigation, The Dark Web

Dark Web Services Current Average Prices

It started with a tweet.

The dark web has long been associated with illegal activities and the sale of illicit goods and services. Among the many services offered on the dark web, hacking services are particularly prevalent.

Daniel’s tweet

We had our PIR and got to writing an Intelligence Requirements sheet following the PESTLEP model and that allowed us to prioritise our Collection Plan.

Collection plan.

With which we were able to start our collection process and begin answering Daniel Card’s Tweet.

The collection process consisted of using the SOS Intelligence platform to identify current active market places for the specific IR areas we had to answer to.

Our platform has the capability to scan the dark web very quickly, with the ability to rotate around all active Onion services within 24-48 hours. This gives us a clear view of current and active Onion services.

In addition SOS Intelligence has a broad range of automatic closed and open forum collection giving us a real time view into purchases and sales.

Gathering the relevant information and calculating averages per service, per market place. 

The research

The research for this article looked at around 40 different current dark web marketplaces and clear web and dark web forums, where hacking services are commonly offered for sale. The average prices for the services mentioned were determined based on the information gathered from these sources.

According to our research, the average price for a stolen credit card on the dark web is around $243.15.

This may seem like a low price, but the value of a stolen credit card can vary depending on the country it was issued in and the remaining balance on the card. For example, a credit card from the United States may be worth more than one from a less economically developed country. To keep things as like for like as possible we took the average card limit for a USA bank.

Counterfeit money is also commonly available on the dark web, with the average price per $1,000 coming in at around $396.24.

This may seem like a high price, but it’s important to remember that producing high-quality counterfeit money can be a time-consuming and expensive process.

Botnets, which are networks of compromised computers used to launch distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, are also commonly available on the dark web.

The average price for a botnet or DDoS attack is around $382.41.

Another common service offered on the dark web is the sale of  so called residential proxies,  which are more difficult to detect and block as they “proxy” a cyber criminals connection out through a residential ISP. These proxies are used to mask the true IP address of the user and are often used by hackers to avoid detection.

The average price for a residential proxy is around $645 per month.

Finally, initial access to a target network is often available for sale on closed forums and marketplaces. This can include login credentials or vulnerabilities in a network that can be exploited to gain access, Initial Access or AI is typically the first ‘open door’ into a victim’s network and can lead to ransomware.

Prices for this service ranged wildly from a few hundred dollars to tens of thousands, due to wide ranging victims and seller motivations, varying greatly depending on access offered, method of access and compromised company.

The average price for initial access to a network is around $7,700. 

In conclusion, the dark web is a hub for a wide range of hacking services, from stolen credit card information to initial access to target networks.

While the prices for these services may seem steep, it’s important to remember that at least for some of the services offered there is a more demand than supply.

It is also important to note that there is no guarantee with any of the services provided and the sellers or marketplaces themselves could be scams or scammers although a majority do offer purchase through escrow.

Header photo by Jefferson Santos on Unsplash.

"SOS
Product news, The Dark Web

SOS Intelligence Dark Web Map

We thought it would be interesting to show you something we generate every now and again…

That is our representation of the SOS Intelligence Dark Web Index, the physical placement of the nodes represents the interconnectivity between onion services on the Dark Web (Tor).

It is an energy model of the network structure of the Dark Web.

The diagram is a visual representation of an energy model of the network structure for interconnecting onion services 

Essentially, If a node has a lot of links, it has a heavier weight applied to it.

If a node has fewer links, it has a lighter weight applied to it and has less weight represented. The more links, the more central we represent that node on the map. Therefore onion services with fewer inbound or outbound links get ‘pushed’ outward to the edges of the map. Onions with more links weigh more so are positioned more centrally.

The colour is a computed modularity class – the social network of the nodes. We have calculated the community networks of the nodes. i.e. how likely it is that a node is linked to other nodes within the network. 

What we get is a spatial representation and social network of around 43000 nodes in the past 24 hours.

The colour itself is random, but the membership of the colour is representative of their social network. What we don’t mean is their Facebook membership, but rather their community connections within the Dark Web.

The visualisation is stunning when seen on a large screen so we have made this available to download here in 4K.

SOS Intelligence Dark Web Render

If you are feeling kind, a tweet or short blog post about this would be much appreciated 🙂

"Go-Ahead
Opinion, The Dark Web

Major UK transport company battles cyber-attack

Another week and yet another cyber-attack on a major UK company. The Guardian broke the news yesterday highlighting that Go-Ahead are facing problems with their back office systems, including bus services and payroll software.

Fortunately it is only affecting the bus services they run and not their rail business.

There are a couple of important things to note here. Firstly, the UK and other countries are seeing more threats to government organisations, transport and infrastructure companies. Infrastructure, by it’s nature, is vital to the smooth running of a countries’ daily life and an interruption to this can cause serious problems.

One of the most infamous cyber attacks to infrastructure took place last year when hackers breached the Colonial Pipeline using a compromised password.

The key aspect of this case was that investigators suspect hackers got password from dark web leak. This scenario is a perfect demonstration of how SOS Intelligence could have helped, alerting the company to this in time and possibly preventing what happened.

In the UK, companies have faced sizeable fines when they have been the subject of a breach and lost customer data.

British Airways was told in July 2019 that it faced a fine of £183m after hackers stole the personal information of half a million customers. Eventually they paid £20M, still a considerable amount.

If you are reading this and wonder if we can help, we probably can. You can book a call and demo here.

"Legal
Opinion, The Dark Web

Hacking your lawyer: Why Legal Firms need Cyber Threat Intelligence

Data breaches are not good for anyone (excluding the cyber criminals), but breaches are particularly bad for industries that handle sensitive information. Unfortunately companies that often handle sensitive data typically do not take their security threats seriously. The pharmaceutical and medical sectors saw a 20% increase in cyber attacks in 2021, costing them, on average, $45,000 per hour of downtime. 

The medical industry is not the only industry handling sensitive data. Legal firms hold a tremendous amount of personal data on, not only clients, but also anyone involved in their respective cases.

For threat actors, legal firms hold a treasure trove of data that they can use for criminal activities such as, financial fraud, extortion, or even just crude doxxing. 

Unlike hospitals and pharmaceutical companies legal firms typically are not held to the same security and data privacy standards and regulations. In the United States acts like HIPAA and GLBA require any company that handles certain information to abide by set security standards. But, regardless of the law, a data breach looks good for no one. 

Defensive security measures like proper data storage and encryption are a must for any legal firm, but these measures can only go so far. In order to take your security to the next level proactive measures are needed.

Luckily for us, threat actors are often very open about their upcoming or ongoing attacks. Hackers will post on dark web forums or even in public chat rooms. 

Publicly posted data leak of a New York legal firm 

Collecting and aggregating this information can be difficult for a small legal firm with less resources. This is where SOS Intelligence comes in. SOS Intelligence can offer your legal firm – small or large – tools to bolster your proactive security measures. 

Due to the nature of established and emerging threat actors, defensive measures like proper data encryption and storage is not enough. Threat actors will always be able to find a way around these defences.

Whether it involves paying an insider for access to your network or exploiting a n-day vulnerability in your VPN software, SOS cyber threat intelligence will be able to provide insider intelligence not found anywhere else. 

Our Dark Web monitoring tool can be utilised for searching for hackers discussing your company. You can quickly build a profile on threat actors targeting your firm then proactively adapt your defensive measures to compensate. 

Getting a sense for threat actors targeting your firm will do wonders for both your cyber defence and – in the case of a breach – can assist incident response. SOS Intelligence offers tools that can actively pull information from common dark web forums and chat rooms. 

Our tools can also grab messages from closed source forums and chats. Dark web monitoring will be able to offer a different perspective than the hundreds of various defensive tools. The SOS Intelligence toolkit will allow you to see through the eyes of a hacker. It’s time to take your security to the next level, try out the SOS toolkit today.

If you are a legal firm who would like some advice on what you need to be doing plus a demo of how we can help you, then click here now to book some time with Amir, our founder. We promise this is something you won’t regret.

Photo by Tingey Injury Law Firm on Unsplash

"Ransomware"/
Ransomware, The Dark Web

Keeping track of the CL0P ransomware group

We’ve been featured again over on ITPro. This time it’s about the latest CL0P ransomware group and the news that they have been busy compromising Swire Pacific Offshore (SPO). They announced it had fallen victim to a cyber attack with “some confidential proprietary commercial information” along with personal information believed to be stolen.

ITPro. article

Sadly, this is an all to common occurrence and one which is increasing in frequency.

If you are concerned about your cyber security and need to monitor the Dark Web, then please schedule a demo. The best 30 minutes you’ve ever spent cold possibly be a slight exaggeration, but you never know!

You can also follow us on Twitter – @sosintel

Photo by Oxa Roxa on Unsplash.

"Cyber
Product news, The Dark Web

Automating Cyber HUMINT Collection

This blog post will attempt to give a high-level overview of how we go about automating typically manual Cyber HUMINT ( “a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources.”) collection. 

Significant elements of this blog will have to be described in general, non-specific, terms or redacted. Due to the nature of the work that we do, keeping our tradecraft methods, tactics and techniques private is important. The methods employed by us are not only commercially sensitive but over disclosure of specific details may render the methods ineffective.

Automating Cyber HUMINT Collection - SOS Intelligence
Screenshot of SOS Intelligence showing OSINT search

OSINT Source Selection

OSINT source collection SOS Intelligence
OSINT source

A fair amount of thought and research goes into selecting our OSINT (Open Source INTelligence) sources. For the most part, ideal collection sources would be ones that offer an API (Application Programming Interface) for information scraping and do so without significant restrictions. 

For example, Pastebin with a paid account grants access to a reasonable scraping API. Using this API we’ve been able to create a custom collection to download each paste, analyse it for relevant customer keywords and, if any matches found, store the paste & alert our customers.

In most cases, however, paste sites typically have no available APIs. Where these sites have a rolling list of new pastes posted, and those pastes can be enumerated & are publicly accessible, further development of a custom collection is required. 

An automated process is used to periodically check for new and available pastes, fetch those pastes in a raw format where possible, perform keyword matching and store where needed. A significant number of paste sites that we collect from, either on the internet or Dark Web, fall into this category. Generally there are no significant technical challenges other than the creation of a bespoke collection for each specific source type.

SOS Intelligence
URL code

As a general rule, for websites that do not have any specifically designed automated collection or scraping method, we apply a high degree of courtesy and do not aggressively scrape the site. 

Since the paste enumeration and paste collection is a fairly lightweight process, and given that pastes in general are uploaded every so often, there is no need for any aggressive polling of a target site.

SOS Intelligence
Lightweight and courteous collection

Authenticated Access

Member only Dark Web Forum
Member only forums

Some of the sources we collect from are closed, member only, Dark Web or internet hacking forums. Without going into too much detail as to how accounts are created on these forums, an account is essential since we must be able to access topics and posts as well as a roll of recent posts. 

In most cases forums helpfully provide a feed of new content by way of RSS (Really Simple Syndication) feed. This can in part, like an API, assist in the creation of a custom automated collection for that source. An additional caveat to this being that the collector passes credentials to the forum so as to appear to be a “logged in” user, e.g. simply viewing posts or browsing the forum. 

A good 30% of all the OSINT sources we collect from are authenticated. To maintain continuous automated collection, we ensure that we have a sufficiently well stocked array of back up accounts for each of the forums we collect from.

Bot Protection Bypass

In some cases the sources we collect from deploy DDoS or Bot Protection. The purpose of this is typically not to prevent scraping or automated collection but more to prevent the site from high volume denial of service attacks. 

The bypass for this defence varies depending on the source. In some cases, for example collection from Doxbin, we employed a CloudFlare challenge bypass method that essentially consists of:

  • Detecting the browser challenge.
  • Solving the challenge.
  • Passing the challenge answer back and obtaining a cookie.
  • Passing the cookie over to the collection processes to begin automated collection. 
  • Detecting when the cookie expires, ensuring any further challenge request are solved.
CloudFlare challenge bypass method
Bot Bypass
CloudFlare challenge bypass method
CloudFlare challenge bypass method

Even when fairly advanced bot/browser verification defences have been deployed by the target source, these have thus far all been mitigated and not prevented our automated OSINT collection. 

As for the Doxbin example, the challenge of bypassing their new bot protection was significant and on balance, considering the quality of the OSINT source, might not have been warranted. It was, however, still a challenge that couldn’t be left unmatched! 

CAPTCHA (Human Verification)

Raid Forums CAPTCHA
Raid Forums CAPTCHA

Automated solving of CAPTCHAs is tricky and is probably the toughest bypass we’ve had to solve so far. The amount of detailed technical information that we can share for how we go about bypassing CAPTCHA is very limited. However, it runs along similar lines to the browser challenge process, whereby detection of a CAPTCHA and the solving of it are tied into the automated collection functions. 

So far there are very few OSINT sources that employ this type of challenge and we’ve been able to mitigate these in all cases whilst maintaining automated collection.

Old school CAPTCHA
Old school challenge!

Staying Undetected

As with the above topic, it is tricky to discuss and share in any level of detail our methods for remaining “undetected“. However, in general we ensure that the accounts we use do not raise any significant cause for concern to the forum operators. 

In most cases, accounts with no post count after a number of months (or sooner!) are deleted. This means that our accounts must have some level of interaction with the forum, however minimal, to ensure their persistence. 

We try, wherever possible, to use Tor to access content. This helps preserve our anonymity in as much as not pinning our collectors down to one location. We also ensure we rotate things like user agents and other fingerprints to ensure relative anonymity. 

Then important aspect to blending in with the noise is ensuring that collection is not overly aggressive and not overly routine. We achieve this by randomising the frequency and timings of either enumeration of new posts, fetching / viewing posts or pastes. The key is to appear sufficiently “human“. This has afforded us the ability, in some cases, to collect with the same account for a year or more without administrator intervention. 

Detecting Faults

This can be even more challenging than bypassing CAPTCHA challenges. The goal for us is to ensure we have sufficiently robust detections for whenever a logged in session expires; a challenge pass expires; the very likely and common scenario of an overloaded website itself going offline or a Tor circuit is struggling. 

To ensure the best chance of successfully reaching a website over Tor, we employ a number of load balanced Tor routers that are themselves proxied and balanced to cater for our crawling services and automated collection. 

But things do go wrong, Tor is not the most reliable tool so our collection processes that utilise it have sufficient retry intervals and “back-off” intervals programmed into them. Should one of our requests result in a gateway time out the system will simply retry, hoping it is balanced to a less utilised Tor relay. 

At times we do get detected and blocked by forum administrators. In such instances, the system will attempt to detect any “authentication loops” and select another account to continue automated collection with. 

Some of the fault detection is relatively simple, such as enumerating how many pages a collection source has and iterating through each page until all pages have been collected.

SOS Intelligence Cyber HUMINT
Collection source
SOS Intelligence Cyber HUMINT
SOS Intelligence Cyber HUMINT

The process is not always perfect, but we try to monitor it and optimise wherever possible. We spend a lot of time on the initial development phases of a collection ensuring that all possibilities, within reason, are accounted for and once a collection goes into production that any following “cat and mouse” changes required are as minimal as possible. 

We hope this gives an insight into how SOS Intelligence works. We have a number of plans available and if you would like to schedule a demo, please click here.

Thanks for reading!

Amir

PS If you enjoyed this, we think you also enjoy An investigation into the LinkedIn data sale on hacker forums.

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